FBR REPORT: Burma Army Attacks Against the Karen People in Northern Karen State, Eastern Burma
Report sent directly from areas under attack
Karen State, Burma
12 December, 2006

In This Report:

Over 76 men, women and children have been killed, 25,000 displaced, people are being used as human shields, over 33 new Burma Army camps have been built and the Burma Army is planning two new roads.
The following is an extensive update on the ongoing offensive in Northern Karen State, Eastern Burma. We are sending this report directly from inside the areas under attack.

1) Introduction
2) Character of the attacks
3) Patterns
4) Nyaunglebin District
5) Papun (Muthraw) District
6) Toungoo District
7) Conclusion
8) Appendix A; Burma Army units involved in this offensive



Villager killed by Burma Army

Burma Army helicopter

Medic treating land-mine victim

Villagers on the run — IDPs

Village house burned to the ground by Burma Army

The Burma Armies offensive in the Northern three districts of the Karen State has killed over 76 men, women and children and displaced over 25, 000 people- most of whom are now in hiding. Over 33 new Burma Army camps have been built in this area of Papun, Nyaunglebyn and Toungoo Districts. The slow but unrelenting attacks and building of new camps seem to driven by a plan to dominate, chase out or crush any Karen people in these areas. This is the largest offensive against the Karen people since 1997. This offensive began in earnest in February this year, with troops from over 50 battalions attacking right through the rainy season, the construction of 7 new main camps and 26 smaller support camps. The Burma Army is now planning the construction two new roads that when complete will cut the northern Karen State into quarters.

While the scale of displacement and destruction is large, people die individually, each death an irreplaceable loss. On the first of November a father of six, Saw They Shur, was burned alive by Burma Army soldiers in his home at Play Hta Village, near Hoki, Toungoo District. He was 47 years old and married with 6 children. His wife and children are now in hiding with the others who escaped the village while it was burned to the ground. And earlier in April, a nine-year-old girl was shot and her father and 80 year
old grandmother killed as her family fled the attacking Burma Army. The disruption of their food production, burning of their homes and the shoot-on-sight orders of the Burma Army, have made staying in their homeland untenable for thousands more.

Of the over 25,000 displaced, over 5,000 people have already left their homes for the Thai border. The people here need immediate protection and the freedom to return to their homes. Because of these attacks they also need food, medicine, shelter and help to rebuild their homes, schools and lives.


During this offensive the Burma Army has deployed over 50 battalions into the Northern districts. These battalions have been attacking in two to four week cycles through out the rainy season. 2-4 battalion-sized task forces with limited objectives conduct most operations. Once these objectives are met, the units return to a base to re-supply and then re-deploy on another series of attacks. The time between attacks is usually 2-4 weeks. Attacks are usually two pronged sweeps with the task force split into two
columns, moving in parallel on separate terrain features and linking up at an intermediate objective. One column of one or two battalions will attack along an axis of advance, destroying villages and chasing the displaced. The other column of 1-2 battalions conducts a parallel movement to contact and then both units meet at the limit of their advance then return to their base of origin or move together to a different support base. When the Burma Army arrives near a village, they often mortar and machinegun the village and then enter the deserted village to loot and sometimes destroy the homes. Landmines are then laid in the village and on the routes that villagers use in and out of the village. If a villager is seen, he or she is shot on sight. Due to the slow progress of the Burma Army and the security provided by the KNU resistance, most people can escape. However, over 76 men, women and children have been killed with 25 of these in Mon Township alone.

When the Burma Army launches attacks these attacks, people in the path of the advance flee into the jungle- usually to prepared hiding places if possible. Once the Burma Army’s initial objective, for example; the patrolling of a given area, the destruction of villages and chasing out of the population, or the building of new camps; is completed and troops return to their camps, and villagers try to return to or near their fields and villages. During this offensive there were many Burma Army units attacking on different fronts. As one resistance leader told us, “The last few months the Burma army has attacked so much that many of the hiding places were overrun and we could not direct all the people- many were scattered in the jungle. Now it is a little better as the Burma Army is busy building up their new camps. But when they are finished with the new camps they will come again. This is a very bad offensive for us all and we do not know how we will manage it. But we must try and we will not leave our homes.”

The resistance (KNU) is trying to protect the people and provide early warning. The villagers try to sustain themselves and their communities by gathering food, even under the guns of the Burma Army.

The numbers displaced at any given time vary depending on the activities of the Burma Army. When the Burma Army troops are out on operations, the people flee. When the troops go back to their camps the people try to come back.


Some patterns are clear and constant:

a) Displacement of the Karen People and willingness to kill civilians:

The displacement of the Karen people in this area has not relented and of the over 25,000 displaced, many will not be able to go back to their homes even if the offensive slows. This is because of the over 33 new Burma Army camps that dominate the area.
The Burma Army has killed over 76 men, women and children during these attacks. The Burma Army seems more focused on driving out the villagers of these areas than engaging the resistance directly. Direct results of these attacks are peopling killed, displaced, villages, farms and food supplies destroyed and trails mined.

b). Food shortage and increased rates of sickness among IDPs:

Indirect results of these attacks have been increasing malnutrition and a higher rate of sickness. Food supplies are very low and without outside help it will be very difficult for the people in hiding to survive. There are many sick people here due to the attacks. Along with increased rates of sickness and mortality, the people here are now much more susceptible to all types of disease, especially dysentery, skin diseases and malaria. There are many sick people here due to the attacks. This is due to living on the run, lack of shelter and clean clothes, poor nutrition and sometimes crowded hide sites. (BPHWT and KHRG have published reports that show the correlation of human rights abuses and the resultant drop of health in the areas under oppression.)
Note: Due to a unusually high patient load, in some areas the FBR relief teams are now going through one medical unit (standardized medical unit for FBR, BPHWT, and KHWD) in one week. Usually this unit can serve over 1,000 people and lasts 3-4 weeks.

c) New Burma Army Camps: (please see complete list of coordinates for these camps at www.freeburmarangers.org https://www.freeburmarangers.org):

33 new Burma Army Camps in 2006. These camps are mostly placed along road lines and the planned new road lines.
I. Nyaunglebin District: 17 new camps (3 main, 14 small camps).
II. Papun District: 7 new camps (2 main, 5 small)
III. Toungoo District: 9 new camps (2 main, 7 small)
Total 33 new camps: 7 new main camps and 26 smaller camps.

Once the Burma Army establishes a new camp, they shell surrounding rice fields, patrol and shoots anyone they see on sight. In spite of the new camps and ongoing operations the people here have not given up and daily try to get to their fields to harvest the remaining rice. For example, on3 December, after going through two abandoned villages and fields where the Burma tried to shoot villagers, we met a group of four women on the trail. We asked them, “Where are you going?” They said they would try to go to their old fields as there was still rice there and they needed to get it for their families. The Karen resistance and those village men with weapons try to provide security. This security is however, limited and cannot stop the mortaring from the camps. The villagers work together to help each other. One villager told us, ” No matter what they do I will not run away, this is my home, I will die here”. We told him, “Don’t die here, your people need you- stay but live”. He then said, “Some have the duty of defense when the Burma Army attack us and some are leaders, but someone has to carry the rice for everyone. I am a strong man and that is what I do, I carry rice for all. So it is not a duty of a great man but it is my duty and I will try my best”.

Still the Burma Army continues to build new camps and as of this report three more are under construction.

d) Use of villagers as human shields and human minesweepers to improve and expand old roads:

Division 66 is forcing villagers to clear landmines and act as human shields on the Toungoo- Mawchi road. Villagers from 12 villages surrounding Baw Ga Lyi Gyi (on the Toungoo-Mawchi road) have been forced to act as human shields around a bulldozer and to go ahead of the construction unit to clear the roadway of potential landmines. One example is the villagers from Maung Pah Der village;

There are 55 households and the Burma Army forced 1 person from each household to take security for the bulldozer with 5 men walking on the left side, 5 men on the right side, 3 men on the bulldozer itself and the rest to walk in front of and behind the bulldozer. This follows the forcing of 850 villagers to carry supplies for the Burma Army and to act as human minesweepers in May and June along the same road.

e) Forced labor: The following are some of the many examples of forced labor in this area.

On 30 November LIB 590 ordered 20 villagers and 6 ox carts from Mae Ta Taw, Myaw Oo, Paw Pi Der, Aung Chan Tha and Htee To Lo villages to carry food supplies their camp. The villagers must move all supplies from Ye Oh Sin to the Htee La Baw Hta Burma Army camp. On 16 November, IB 439 and battalion commander Zaw Tun in Sha Zee Bo camp, demanded 125 ox carts from area villagers to help the Burma Army move their rations.

On 5 December, Division 66 commander Maung Maung Aye ordered LIB 6 Battalion commander Aung Soe Win, Kaw Thay Der to send 35 people from Kaw Thay Der village to carry Army supplies from Kaw Thay Der to Now Soe. People were also ordered to carry supplies from Naw Soe camp back to Baw Ga Li Gyi camp. On the same day General Maung Maung Aye ordered villagers from Wa Thee Ko to cut 300 pieces of bamboo and take them to Wa Thee Ko for the building up of the camp there.

f) Roads:
The Burma Army is using forced labor, human shields and human minesweepers to improve their existing road network in the mountains east of Toungoo. Along with these existing roads, the Burma Army is now planning two new roads. The Burma Army is now surveying a proposed new road from Ler Mu Plaw in Papun District to Busakee in Toungoo District. When completed this road will cut the Northern Karen State into quarters.

The Burma Army MOC 10 and one TOC of MOC 15 are advancing on the high ground west of the Yunzalyn River along this planned new road from Ler Mu Plaw to Busakee. There are six new small camps on this route now. Villagers attempting to go back near their fields to harvest their rice are shot on sight. (We heard them shoot at villagers on the near Thaw Ku Mu Der on 25
November – there were no casualties). A second road is being planned that will connect Mon township in Nyaunglebyn District to Toungoo District at Busakee.

g) Forced Relocation:
In this area three new forced relocation sites were newly established starting in April 2006.
1) Tha Byin Nyu relocation site = More than 1,000 people from Yu Lo and Ka Mu Lo villages.
2) Maw Kae Tha Per Ko relocation site (Kanazobyin) = Between 750-800 people from Maw Kae Tha Per Ko, Au Ywa, Tha Kewy La Ko villages.
3) Maladaw, Mon Township= 900 people to a relocation site Mon Township, Nyaunglebyn District, Karen, State.

900 people from three villages, located near Maladaw Burma Army Camp have now been forced to move to the relocation site. This forced relocation site is located around a cemetery the villagers used to use. Maw Ka Tha Per Ko, Maladaw village, and Tho Kway Lay Ko villagers were forced to leave their villages and move to a relocation site west of Maladaw Camp. The Burma Army has taken over the villages and is now cutting down the trees to build bunkers and fortifications around Maladaw Camp. The soldiers have stripped the villagers’ cashew and durian orchards.

All villagers who live in the relocation site have been forced to build their homes close together in rows. Daily worship is forbidden except once week. There is a daily curfew and the villagers are not allowed to leave the area without permission. They can go to the market on Tuesday and Saturday only. They can go to their fields with only food for the day and must return to the relocation site by 16:00hrs. The Burma Army has warned the villagers that they have placed landmines around the relocation site to ensure compliance. The villagers must pay Kyat 30,000 tax for a new home in the relocation site. People are forced to improve roads and provide labor on demand for the Burma Army. The relocation of these 900 people began in May 2006 and was completed in November 2006.

h) Prisoner Porters:1,700 porter, 265 dead.

The Burma Army has used over 1,700 porters in this offensive and over 265 have been reported to have died, many who were executed. Among the porters in Papun Distict alone, there are over 20 child porters (boys under 16 years old from Insein Prison). The Burma Army is now using the term, “transporter”-“Woon Htan”, instead of “prisoner porter” to describe the people they force to carry their loads. The following information is from escaped porters, Burma Army deserters and villagers who have seen the bodies of dead porters. Porters are beaten and poorly fed. If they cannot carry loads they are often beaten to death or shot. Some who become sick are given an injection of an unknown drug and these porters are reported to die within a few hours.

Porters killed by Burma Army or died from sickness as they carried loads:

Nyaunglebyn District: Of the over 400 porters used in this area, over 20 have died.

Papun District: Of the over 700 porters used in this area, 150 porters died- by torture, by execution and by sickness (dysentery is the most sited).

Toungoo District: Of the over 600 prisoner porters (not counted is the over 850 villagers used to carry loads for the Burma Army), 95 were killed. Some, reportedly by having their throats cut, others starved to death.

Total: 1,700 porters, 265 dead.

i) Landmines:

The Burma Army is making extensive use of landmines in villages, homes and trails in order to make the area unlivable for the population. The Burma Army copy of the M-14 anti-personnel mine is becoming very common with nine of these landmines recovered in one village area alone. The Burma Army also uses larger mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) as described in one example below.

Burma Army landmine/IED kills three and wounds eight in Mon Township, Nyaunglebyn district, Karen State, Eastern Burma on 2 December, 2006. After chasing the villagers away from the Baw Kwey Day (Ti Ko) area of Mon township, the Burma Army entered the village and placed this landmine under a fireplace with the triggering device/pressure plate buried in the ground close to the fireplace. A group of resistance soldiers (KNU) who were providing security for the displaced people in this area triggered this landmine/IED. Three died and eight more were injured, four of them seriously. The landmine/IED was not the normal type used by the Burma Army. The hole dug for the mine was over one and one half meters deep and 15 centimeters wide. The hole seemed to be dug by an auger or posthole digger. The device was triggered by a blasting cap and what seems to be a piece of detonation cord that was placed on a stump and ran down to the mine. When the men gathered around the fire they stepped on a pressure plate that fired the blasting cap and ignited the detonation cord that set off the mine. There was a delay of three seconds from the time the men heard the ignition and the explosion. It is possible that the mine also bounced up one meter before it exploded or this was an anti-vehicle shape-charge that directed the explosion straight up. One man suffered massive head trauma and died instantly, one man lost both legs and died instantly and one man died while being carried to a mobile clinic. The survivors are now being treated and when stabilized, some will need to be evacuated for more extensive medical care.

Over 33 men, women (including a pregnant woman) and children have been killed by the Burma Army. 11,000 displaced in all three townships. This number varies from 5,000-11,000 depending on Burma Army activities.

8 villagers killed and 2,000-6000 displaced depending on Burma army activities. Recent attacks on 25 November in Shwey Gyin Township and patrolling in Kauk Kyi Township. Military Operation Command (MOC) 21 is operating in Kauk Kyi and Shwey Gyin Township, Nyaunglebin District. IB 47, IB 56, IB 223, IB 237, IB 276, LIB 320, LIB 387,LIB 438, LIB 601,LIB602

25 five civilians have been killed and over 5,000 people displaced in Mon township.
Mon Township: over 3,000 displaced now (over 1,500 IDPs north of the Mon Chaung, over 1,600 IDPs south of the Mon Chaung) 1,000 in other Districts. Over 1,000 to refugee camps or IDP safe site out of the District.

MOC 16: Brigadier General They Oo-commander LIB 507 at Paungziet-Maldaw-Ka Pa Ta; patrolling against the civillians hiding in the jungle north of the Mon river, in Mon township, Nyaunglebin District, Karen State. *units attacking in Mon township, other MOC 16 units
are operating in township, Toungoo District.
*LIB 522 at Maladaw camp.
*LIB 567 at The Byn Yu-Maladaw- Te La Baw Hta
*LIB 568 at Play Sa Lo-Ye Ta Gone
*LIB 323 at Paunziet; building a new camp and patrolling against the civilians hiding in the jungle in the area North of the Mon river..
*IB 240 at Po Ro Soe- a new camp west of the Pada Cahuang River.
*IB 241 Ka Mu Loe Mon/Tantabin border area but have been ordered back to rest and refit at Shan State-Thien De camp in Shan State.
IB 242 at Play Sa Lo
IB 68 in Toungoo District- exact location unknown.
*IB 69 at Te Wa Bwey Kee , a new camp near Kyauk Pia. Under Southern Command:
(Also of Southern Command-LIB 590 and LIB 599 are patrolling the Kyauk Kyi – Hsa Hta road in the area east of Muthey camp).

Number of villagers killed in Mon Township alone by the Burma Army since February 2006:.
25 villages killed, 4 wounded
24 by gunshot, 1 by landmine
3 men wounded and 1 child (9 yr old girl).
Villages and number killed:
Saw Ka Der 3 villagers killed (1 women, 1 man, 1 child)
Ler Kla 4 villagers killed (4 men)
Tee La Baw Hta 1 villager killed (1 child)
Kwee De Kaw 3 villagers killed (3 men)
Kauk Pia 3 villagers killed (2 men 1 80 yr old woman)

They Baw Der 2 villagers killed (2 men)
Saw Wa Der 2 villagers killed (2 men)
Kyauk Kyi Pauk 2 villagers killed (2 men)
Paw Pe Der 1 villager killed (1 man)
Ma La Daw 4 villagers killed (4 men)

Mon Township village tracts most under attack.
1) Saw Ka Der 300 people 5 villages
2) Tee La Baw Ta 3 Villages
3) Ler Kla 4 Villages
4) Kwee De Kaw 9 Villages
5) Kyauk Pya 3 Villages
6) Thy Baw Der 4 Villages
7) Yaw Kee 1Village
8) Keaw Pu Der 1 village
9) Saw Ti Der 1 village
Total 31 villages

(KNU soldiers killed by landmines=3, 1 villager killed by landmine, 5 KNU soldiers injured by thier own mines.)
Burma Army killed and wounded in Mon township since February=over 100.

Four villages were burned and many field houses and rice barns burned through out Mon Township. Landmines were then placed on trails and in the remains of the villages themselves.
Burned villages in Mon township: Htee La Baw Hta village tract-Nwa Hta and They Kwey Lu villages burned. Kwee De Kaw village tract-Tha Po Hta village burned and police station nearby burned. Saw Ka Der village tract- Ti Say Day village burned.

7 Village Tracts of 21 villages completely abandoned. In the remaining 7 village tracts some villages still have some of their population while some have lost over half the village as people fled attacks and did not come back.

*Abandoned village tracts:
Ler Kla*
Tee La Baw Hta*
Kwee De Kaw*
Kauk Pia*
Saw The Der*
Kwey Pa Der*
Yaw Kee*
Villages that have less than half their usual population.
Saw Ka Der-less than half.
Klaw Kee “
They nwey Kee “
Saw Kee “
Ti Ko “
Tha Wa Po “
They Baw Der “
Play Pa “
Play Kee “
K’Ser Kaw Hti “
Saw Wa Der “

Roads now being planned in Mon township – Tha Byin Nyu-Maladaw-Chipyaung-cross the Paly or Yaukthawa river-Yaw Kee-Busakee

In June and July over 7,000 people were displaced. Over 20 convict porters reported killed and two villagers were killed and seven wounded by the Burma Army. When the Burma Army shifted its’ focus to the new road project from Ler Mu Plaw to Busakee many people were able to return to their villages. However, as of this report, there are still over 3,000 displaced. The projected new road is called the Nay Phe Daw Road, named after the new capitol of Burma. Along the proposed route of this road 11 villages and over 2,100 people have been displaced

Ti Si Ki : 59 F, 74 M = 143 total (17 families)
Thy Thoo Ki : 53 families= 334 total
So Pa Ko : 167 F, 181 M = 348 total (41families)
Thaw Ku Mu Der : 129 F, 125 M = 254 total (37 families)
The Ne Ko : 50 family= 84 F, 80 M = 160 total
Kay Pu * Not run = 69 family = 450 total
Haw Thay Kee = 20 total
Plo Ki = 200 run and now are back, but ready to flee again
Naw Baw Law Paly = 50 total
Ka Baw Kee 79 families-flee and return
Thay Bo P;aw, Klo Klaw Hta, Tee Mu Kee
Thay Wa Jo 30 families = 100 people total

41 men, women and children have been killed by the Burma Army. In November two children, a five-year-old girl and two-year-old boy were captured by the Burma Army and have not been released. Their condition is not known. An escaped porter reported seeing 95 executed convict porters during this offensive in Toungoo Distict. There are over 6,000 people displaced in Toungoo District now.

Division 66 and MOC 15 are attacking villagers and trying to push a new road from Busakee to Ler Mu Plaw in Papun District. Five new camps have been built this year. Thee Burma Army continues to burn villages, build up the five new camps it has built there and is forcing villagers to clear landmines and act as human shields on the Toungoo- Mawchi road. Villagers from 12 villages surrounding Baw Ga Lyi Gyi (on the Toungoo-Mawchi road), have been forced to act as human shields around a bulldozer and to go ahead of the construction unit to clear the roadway of potential landmines. 12 Villages (Baw Ga Lyi Gyi, Ye To Gyi, Yee Tho Gale, Si Si Thaung, Kyaw Ponge, Baw Ga Li Ley, Ga Mu Der, Der Doh, Mae Kyaw,Sa Ba Gyi, Kubyaung, Pyaungtho)

The village of Ber Ka Lay Ko was attacked and burned by IB 11 and IB 14 on 14 November 2006. On 16 November IB 11 and IB 14 then burned They Gi La village. On the same day these two units then burned Htee Hsa Ber village. MOC 16 troops are trying to block all travel from the plains to the mountains. The area east of the villages of Htee Nyah Bel Lo , Htee Co Lo , Play Hser Lo, Bo Moe Dee , Shan Zee Bo ,Tantabin, Swa Lo, and Da Pyin Noint is being patrolled and all travel stopped. No rice or any goods are allowed to go from the plains to the mountains. Villages and IDP sites mortared:On 22/11/ 06 at 12: 00 hrs, Battalion IB6 column 1,2 attacked the Saw Wa Der area with mortars attempting to destroy the IDPs hiding there. At 1600 they fired 15 more mortar rounds into the Sho Ta IDP area On December the 6th, Battalion IB 35 from Pa Na So Army camp and LIB 6 from Kaw Thay Der mortared Saw Wa Der village with 60 mm mortars. They fired mortars throughout the day and ceased firing at 18:30 hrs.

Children Captured:
On 22.11.06 Burma Army Division 66 TOC 662 attacked Klay War Moh Taung village and captured a group of villagers on their way to Kler Ler village. All the villagers but two children were released. A five-year-old girl and 3-year-old boy are still captive. Naw P’ Lay Way is five years old and Saw Taw K’ Loh Mu is three years old. They are from Tee Hser Bur village and are the children of Saw Hser Hla Lar.

Adults captured:
2.12.06 Two men, Saw May Htoo 47 yrs and his son Saw Thaw Thi Htoo, 17 yrs from Taw Ku village, Tan Ta Bin Township, were captured by the Burma Army and taken to
Taw Ku BA IB 48 camp. They have not been release yet. The family has been forced to move to Taw Ku village.

Headmen Captured:
3.12.06 Three headmen captured and taken to IB 48 camp at Taw Ku.
Headman from Jee Pyu Kon village,U Ba Sein, 50 yrs- not released yet.
Headman from Taw Ku village, U Shwe Moung, 50 yrs- not released yet.
Headman from Ye Shan village was captured and now has been released.

North of the Toungoo–Mawchi road the Burma Army continues patrolling since it burned down Ber Ka Lay Ko village and Oo Per villages, on 14 November. Troops from Division 66 killed three villagers and captured over 30 men, women and children-their status is unknown. The Burma Army has a plan to improve the road to Mawchi.


The Burma Army used helicopters on 6 and 7 December to move troops and supplies to Busakee Camp, Toungoo District, Karen State, Eastern Burma. Busakee is located at the terminus of the Toungoo- Baw Ga Lyi Gyi- Busakee road and is one of the launch points for the Burma Army for this offensive that has displaced over 25,000 this year. MOC 15 commanded by General Aung Nyeing, is headquartered at this base. Busakee is located at: Latitude/Longitude: N 18 44’ 00” E 96 56’ 10” British 1 inch, 1:63,360 Map: Map Sheet 94 B/14 473 705
On 6 December, two helicopters each made six round trips from Pyinmana to Busakaee Camp, dropping off 68 troops and one load of ammunition and rations. Arrival times: Between 0830-1630 hrs. (All times local Burma time).
On 7 December, Two helicopters made three round trips each to drop off ammunition and rations and then one helicopter made a final flight and dropped of a load of men wearing white shirts and longyis. First flight arrived at Busakee Camp at 0830 (All times are local Burma time). Second flight arrived at 1130 and the third flight arrived at 1330 and the fourth flight of one helicopter arrived 1430. All helicopters have now returned to Pyinmana. (Note: The use of helicopters by the Burma Army to move troops at the front line is unusual.)

The Burma Army is attempting to destroy the KNU in the Northern Districts and completely dominate the Karen people. This is the largest offensive since 1997 and the over 25,000 displaced people are in a dangerous situation. The international community needs to take action now to stop the Burma Army and provide immediate relief for the people under attack.

God bless you,
A Relief Team Leader
Free Burma Rangers

Note on casualties: Although the Burma Army has committed one division (10 battalions), four MOC (7-10 battalions in the field per MOC) and troops from Southern Command, they have not been able to chase out all of the Karen nor have they been able to decisively defeat the Karen resistance (KNU).
Total estimated Burma Army casualties for this offensive in 2006 are over 1,150, while total KNU casualties are 19 dead and 36 wounded.
Nyaunglebyn: 197 Burma Army KIA/WIA. 9 KNU KIA/ 15 WIA.
Papun: Over 460 Burma Army KIA/WIA. 5 KNU KIA/ 11 WIA
Toungoo: Over 500 Burma Army KIA/WIA. 5 KNU KIA/ 10 WIA.
Please see our report on the website: “An appreciation of the Situation”, January 2006, for an analysis of how the Burma Army fights and why the resistance can still continue.

The Burma Army has deployed troops from Southern Command, Division 66 and four Military Operations Commands; MOC 10, MOC 15, MOC 16,and MOC 21. MOC 15, MOC 16, and MOC 21 are reported to be under the Operational Command of the Southern (Regional) Command Headquartered at Toungoo. Division 66 is leading the attack in Toungoo District and MOC 10 is operating as the security force for the Kyauk Kyi- Hsaw Hta road and is supporting MOC 15’s attacks and building of camps along the line of the projected new road that will divide Papun and Toungoo Districts. The units involved in this offensive are listed below:

Southern Command – HQ at Taungoo; Maj Gen Ko Ko in Command.
Now operating in Toungoo and Northern Nyaunglebyn District.
IB 30, IB 39, IB 48, IB 53, IB 57, IB 60, IB 73, IB 75, IB 124, IB 264, LIB 349, LIB 350, LIB 351,LIB 439,LIB 440, LIB 589,LIB 90, LIB 599

Military Operation Command ( MOC 10) – HQ at Kalay, Sagaing Division (from the Northwest Command) Operating on the Kyauk Kyi- Hsaw Hta road and supporting MOC 15 operations in Papun District.
LIB 361,LIB 362,LIB 363,LIB 364, LIB 365,LIB 366, LIB 367,LIB 368,LIB 369,LIB 370, (Note: On the first week of December, the units belonging to MOC 15 (One TOC of MOC 15 had the new road mission), were replaced by one TOC of MOC 10. The MOC 15 units then went back to the Ler Mu Plaw area to take the place of the MOC 10 units. The reasons for this change are yet unknown.)

Military Operation Command (MOC) 15 – HQ at Buthidaung, Arakan State (from the Western Command) Split into two TOC’s of three line and one HQ battalion. One TOC in Tougoo District advancing south into Papun District from the vicinity of Baw Ga Lyi Gyi and Busakee; One TOC advancing North from Papun District into Toungoo District. These two forces are opening up a route for a new road that when complete will connect the PwaGawa-Ler Mu Plaw road to the Busakee- Baw Ga Lyi Gyi- Toungoo road. This road will divide the Northern Karen State into quarters and split the Papuna and Tungoo Districts. Brigadier General Aung Nye is the MOC15 commander at Busakee. TOC 1 (LIB 552 and LIB 551) are at Busakee. LIB 352 and LIB 353 at Plo Mu Der Piang Ma Tho)- 7 miles west of Busakee. And one TOC, TOC 2, (LIB 534, LIB 565, LIB 564) in the Kapu area of Northwest Papun (Muthraw) district. This unit is building camps and surveying the planned new road from Ler Mu Plaw to Busakee.
Units: LIB 345, LIB 352, LIB 353, LIB 535, LIB 536, LIB 537, LIB 551, LIB 552, LIB 564, LIB 565.

Military Operation Command (MOC) 16 – HQ at Thein Ni, Shan State ( from Northeast Command) – Col Zay Oo- commander. MOC 16 is operating both in Southern Tantabin Township, Toungoo District and Mon Township, Nyaunglebyn District.
IB 68, IB 69, IB 240, IB 241, IB 242, LIB 323, LIB 507,LIB 522, LIB 567, LIB 568.

Military Operation Command (MOC) 21 – HQ at Moe Mait, Kachin State (Northern Command) – Col Aye Hlaing MOC 21 is operating in Kauk Kyi and Shwey Gyin Township, Nyaunglebin District.
IB 47, IB 56, IB 223, IB 237, IB 276, LIB 320, LIB 387,LIB 438, LIB 601,LIB 602

Light Infantry Division 44 – HQ at Thaton, Mon State – Brig Gen Hla Myint Swe. Now in the Sittang river valley- not yet directly involved in this operation but in support.
IB 2, IB 8, LIB 1, LIB 2, LIB 3, LIB 9, LIB 102, LIB 104, LIB 118, LIB 207.

Light Infantry Division 66 – HQ at Pyi, Pegu Division
Division 66 is attacking in the Than Daung and Tantain Townships Toungoo District.
IB 1,IB 11, IB 14, IB 35, IB 80, IB 4, LIB 5, LIB 6, LIB 10, LIB 108,

(Light Infantry Division 101 – HQ at Pakkoku, Magwe Division-not directly involved in this offensive- local patrolling).
LIB 251, LIB 252,LIB 253, LIB 254, LIB 258, LIB 259)